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DISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS:
THE ARGENTINA-GREAT BRITAIN CONFLICT OF 1982
NICOLAS J. WATKINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Colony of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies lies in the
South Atlantic Ocean three hundred miles east of the southern tip
of South America.1 The Falkland Islands themselves consist of
East Falkland and West Falkland, separated by the Falkland
Sound, and an additional one hundred smaller islands. Although
the Falklands are a British crown colony,' sovereignty over them is
also claimed by Argentina. This comment analyzes and evaluates
the competing British and Argentine claims to the Falkland Is-
lands and thereby attempts to determine the legality of actions
taken by Argentina and Great Britain in the armed conflict be-
tween the two countries which occurred in 1982.
When the events upon which a nation bases a claim to sover-
eignty over territory occurred over three hundred years ago, evi-
dence of an acquisition of sovereignty is often scant. Yet, in the
area of international law relating to claims of title to territory,
nothing is more important than the history of events upon which
each claimant founds its claims. Often, the success of a claim to
sovereignty has turned upon the performance of an act which at
first might have seemed innocuous. For this reason, the following
account of the 1982 conflict and the historical background to the
dispute over sovereignty in the South Atlantic are necessarily long
and detailed.
The dispute between Argentina and Great Britain and their re-
spective claims to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands
dates back to the eighteenth century.3 It appeared to be a "rather
abstract quarrel between the two nations, neither of which had a
vital national interest at stake. '' 4 Indeed, it seemed as though it
was a dispute which was "neither important enough to resolve, nor
*The author is a British citizen currently studying law at Florida State University.
1. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 38 (15th ed. 1982).
2. 5 CHAMBERS ENCYCLOPEDIA 549 (1973) [hereinafter CHAMBERS].
3. See J. GOEBEL, JR., THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (1927).
4. The Sunday Telegraph, Oct. 10, 1982, at 8, col.2.
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unimportant enough to forget."5 However, this was to change dras-
tically on April 2, 1982.
II. INVASION
After years of sporadic efforts to make Great Britain submit to
Argentina's claims to the islands, which Britain had controlled
since 1833, Argentina decided to take them by force. On April 2,
1982, the Argentine militia invaded the Falkland Islands. On the
following day, the United Nations Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 5026 which demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Ar-
gentine forces from invaded territories, including the Dependen-
cies, South Georgia, and the Sandwich Islands, which had been
occupied during the last week of March. In addition, Resolution
502 called for the cessation of hostilities and called on the govern-
ments of Argentina and Great Britain "to seek a diplomatic solu-
tion to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations." 7
Ten members voted for the resolution while four, including Rus-
sia, abstained. Only Panama voted against it. It was clear Argen-
tina had miscalculated, for the Argentine foreign minister, Sefior
Nicanor Costa Mendez, had earlier assured the ruling Argentine
military junta that Russia, a permanent member of the Council
whose negative vote would have constituted a veto, would bar any
resolution.8
Indeed, the drastic action taken by the junta turned out to be a
costly mistake, both politically and in terms of lives lost during the
two-and-one-half month long conflict.' Apparently believing that
the Falklands lacked strategic importance, the Argentine generals
never really thought that the British would fight. However, they
underestimated the political climate in Britain and domestic pres-
sure on Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister.
Within twenty-four hours of the invasion, Mrs. Thatcher had
formed a personal view that a successful take-over of the Falklands
would be a great national humiliation and would also mean the fall
of her government. "This impression was reinforced. . . by a hur-
5. Id.
6. S.C. Res. 502 (April 3, 1982) (currently unavailable in SCOR Supp).
7. Id.
8. The Sunday Telegraph, supra note 4, at 8, col. 4.
9. Argentine casualties during the hostilities totalled 1,200. British casualties amounted
to 255 dead and 777 wounded. Over 10,000 Argentine prisoners were returned to Argentina
after their surrender. See Kreslins, Chronology 1982, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 714, 741 (1982).
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ried canvas of Tory opinion throughout the country."'10 The Houge
of Commons met for the first Saturday session since the Suez crisis
of 1956; the atmosphere was one of "fury, incomprehension and
recrimination."" One Tory member of the House of Commons, Mr.
Edward du Cann, declaimed that "the defence of our realm begins
wherever British people are."' 2 For the opposition, Mr. John Silkin
characterized the invasion as "aggression of a Fascist dictatorship
and a Fascist junta,"'3 while Mr. Foot, the leader of the opposition,
insisted that "foul and brutal aggression does not succeed in our
world."" It was in this mood that the vanguard of the British fleet
was assembled and dispatched to the South Atlantic on April 6,
1982, in order to retake the Falkland Islands and reestablish Brit-
ish pride and sovereignty.
During the three weeks it took for the British fleet to travel the
8,000 miles to the Falklands, efforts were made to find a diplo-
matic solution. 5 These attempts to avoid military conflict between
Argentina and Great Britain consisted of the long-distance shuttle
diplomacy of United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig.
However, despite his efforts, negotiations failed, for Argentina in-
sisted that before any negotiations could begin, the issue of sover-
eignty had to be resolved in her favor."6 For the United Kingdom,
this would remove the whole point of negotiating, which was to
resolve disputed claims to sovereignty. 7 It would also practically
constitute a British submission to Argentina's use of force.
On April 25, British forces, in a two-hour battle, recaptured
South Georgia Island.'" Although no formal concessions were made
on sovereignty, the British Government nevertheless repeatedly of-
fered peace plans.' 9
On April 30, the United Kingdom declared a two-hundred-mile
"Total Exclusion Zone" around the Falkland Islands and warned
that any ship entering it would be sunk.20 Argentina had imposed a






15. See Purcell, War and Debt in South America, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 660, 661-62 (1982).
16. Id. at 662.
17. Id.
18. The. Sunday Telegraph, supra note 4, at 9, col. 3.
19. Id.
20. Kreslins, supra note 9, at 740.
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Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, which was menacing the Brit-
ish fleet by sailing back and forth outside the southwest edge of
the exclusion zone with two destroyer escorts, was torpedoed by
the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror.21 The General
Belgrano sank rapidly. Over three hundred Argentine crewmen
were lost.
The Argentine response was immediate. On May 4, the British
destroyer HMS Sheffield, was hit by a French-made Exocet mis-
sile.22 Over the next two weeks, British warships and aircraft at-
tacked Argentine positions on the east side of East Falkland Is-
land, around the capital of Port Stanley and its airfield.2
Back in the United Kingdom, there was a feeling of anticipation.
Last minute negotiations were still going on. On the morning of
May 20, Sefior Perez de Cueller, Secretary-General of the United
Nations, remarked that "the patient is in intensive care but still
alive."' 24 Later that day, however, Sir Anthony Parsons borrowed
the metaphor when he stated: "Our view is that the patient died at
midday. 25
Indeed, by May 21, British forces were on the Falkland Islands
and a firm beachhead had been established at San Carlo, on the
west side of East Falkland Island.2 6 Now began the great
"yomp"-Marine slang for a forced march across rugged terrain.
By June 2, the British were within seven miles of Port Stanley.2 7
Twelve days later, on June 14, the Argentine forces on the Falk-
lands surrendered to the British.2 8 Major General Moore, the com-
mander of the British Land Forces, declared that "[tihe Falkland
Islands are once more under the Government desired by their
inhabitants. '2 9
Using the classical analysis of territorial acquisition under inter-
national law, this comment will analyze the legal foundations upon
which the respective British and Argentine claims to the Falkland
Islands are founded. On the basis of the results of such an analysis,
an examination will be made of the legality of the actions taken by
the combatant nations in the 1982 conflict. First, however, the his-
21. Id. See also The Sunday Telegraph, supra note 4, at 9, col. 4.
22. The Sunday Telegraph, supra note 4, at 9, cal. 5.
23. Kreslins, supra note 9, at 741.
24. The Sunday Telegraph, Oct. 17, 1982, at 10, col. 4.
25. Id.
26. Kreslins, supra note 9, at 741.
27. The Sunday Telegraph, supra note 24, at 11, col. 2.
28. Kreslins, supra note 9, at 741; The Sunday Telegraph, Oct. 24, 1982, at 10, col. 7.
29. The Sunday Telegraph, supra note 28, at 10, col. 7.
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torical background to the dispute over the Falklands will be de-
scribed and the competing claims to the islands identified. The
traditional modes of territorial acquisition will be applied to these
claims in order to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses under
international law. Only then will it be possible to determine the
legality of actions taken by Great Britain and Argentina during the
armed conflict of 1982 in terms of both customary international
law and the United Nations. Charter.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE
The Falkland Islands were first sighted by Europeans at the end
of the sixteenth century. The first known landing was by the Brit-
ish in the person of Captain Strong in 1690. However, the first
known settlement was not until the latter half of the eighteenth
century.30 East Falkland was colonized in 1764 with the founding
of Port Louis as a staging post for the French penetration of the
Pacific.3 1 After protests from Spain, who claimed dominion over all
South America,32 the settlement on East Falkland was formally
sold to Spain three years later.33
Meanwhile, on West Falkland, the British remained active. In
1765, after a survey of the Falklands was taken, a British squadron
established a settlement at what later came to be called Port
Egmont. 4 In 1769, the Spaniards, having earlier forcibly removed
the French, resolved to send the British home as well.35 The Span-
ish intendant at Buenos Aires sent a force of 1,400 soldiers to expel
the settlers. The British surrendered and the Spanish occupied
Port Egmont on June 10, 1770.36
In the following year, however, under the threat of war between
Britain and Spain, Spain disavowed the action of the Governor of
Buenos Aires and delivered up the settlement at Port Egmont to
30. 5 CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 549.
31. Metford, Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute, 44 INT'L AFF. 463,
467 (1968).
32. Id. Spain claimed sovereignty over the Falkland Islands through a papal grant of
authority. Between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, the reigning Popes granted
Christian monarchs the right to acquire territory in the possession of heathens and infidels.
The powers of the Pope over these territories were, however, disputed. For further discus-
sion of these papal grants, see M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-28 (1926).
33. Glover, International Law in the Falkland Islands, 1982 NEW ZEALAND L.J. 191.
34. 5 CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 549; Metford, supra note 31, at 467.
35. Metford, supra note 31, at 467.
36. Id.
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the British without prejudice to their right of sovereignty. 37 Unfor-
tunately, however, due to the high cost of keeping the settlement
in proportion to its overall value, the British were forced to with-
draw in 1774.38 Even so, evidence of British sovereignty, in the
form of a plaque reiterating British rights, was left behind.39
In the absence of the British, the Spanish reasserted their sover-
eignty over the Falklands. Although they left West Falkland alone
after 1777, the Spaniards maintained a settlement at Port Louis
(now named Soledad) on East Falkland and appointed a governor
who remained there until 1806.40 After the withdrawal of the Span-
ish garrison in 1811, Spain took no futher interest in the Falkland
Islands which, except for occasional foreign -whalers, remained
uninhabited until 1820.41
In 1820, after the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, which caused
the links between the Spanish Crown and the Spanish possessions
overseas to be broken, the Government of the United Provinces of
La Plata claimed the group of islands as a former Spanish posses-
sion.42 After an unsuccessful effort to establish a settlement, a suc-
cessful private attempt was made by Louis Vernet, a naturalized
Argentinian, who was subsequently appointed Governor of the
Falkland Islands in 1829."8 The British protested sharply against
this action by Argentina, and made it clear to the Argentines that
they had acted without giving any consideration to British rights
in the islands." According to the British, the naval force at Port
Egmont had been withdrawn in 1774 for reasons of economy, but
sovereignty had not been abandoned.45
In 1831, Vernet arrested three American ships for alleged illegal
fishing. One ship escaped, one was allowed to fish on the condition
that Vernet shared in the profits, and the third was taken to Bue-
nos Aires for its captain to stand trial.4 Thereupon, the United
States, believing that Argentina had no right to the islands and
37. 5 CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 549.
38. Metford, supra note 31, at 468.
39. Id.
40. 5 CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 549.
41. Metford, supra note 31, at 468.
42. 5 CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 549. Much of the Argentine case for sovereignty rests
upon her claim that upon independence from Spanish rule she inherited the rights which
Spain had abandoned.
43. Id.
44. See Metford, supra note 31, at 472.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 473-74.
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that Vernet was undertaking an act of piracy, dispatched a warship
and demilitarized the Argentine port of Soledad in December of
the same year.47 Twelve months later, the British took formal pos-
session of Port Egmont and, in January, 1833, the Argentines at
Soledad surrendered to a small British squadron.' 8
Since 1833, the Falkland Islands have been in the continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the United Kingdom. 9 Although
Argentina has protested sporadically in the twentieth century, she
did not decide to pursue her claim to the Falkland Islands through
the United Nations until the 1960's. In 1965, Resolution 20650 was
adopted, by which Argentina and the United Kingdom were in-
vited to seek a negotiated settlement to the problem.
Both Argentina and Great Britain have looked to the foregoing
events in support of their claims to the Falkland Islands. The next
stage in the discussion is to analyze each nation's claims for their
legal validity under the modes of territorial acquisition in custom-
ary international law in order to determine which nation was sov-
ereign over the Falkland Islands immediately before the 1982
invasion.
IV. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE CLAIMS MADE BY
ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN
Territorial sovereignty is "[t]he right of a state to function
within a certain territory, unimpeded by any interference from the
outside. ' '51 Sovereignty over territory can be acquired through dis-
covery, occupation, conquest, annexation, cession, accretion, and
prescription.5 2 Due to the very nature of the dispute between Ar-
gentina and Great Britain, however, discovery, occupation and pre-
scription are the modes of acquiring title most relevant to the pre-
sent analysis.
Even so, before embarking on the actual examination of the
methods of territorial acquisition, it should be noted that in con-
sidering the legal implications of the facts outlined above, the in-
tertemporal law has to be borne in mind. That is, a "judicial fact
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it,
47. Id. at 474. See also 5 CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 549.
48. 5 CHAMBERS, supra note 2, at 549.
49. Metford, supra note 31, at 476.
50. G.A. Res. 2065, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 57, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
51. 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (1963).
52. For detailed discussion of each of these modes of territorial acquisition, see I G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 398-469 (1980).
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and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to
it arises or fails to be settled." 3 Thus, the determination of the
validity of the respective claims of Argentina and Great Britain
must be made in light of the international law in force in the sev-
enteenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 4
Moreover, "title in international law is a relative conception,
whereas title in municipal law is an absolute one."" This is be-
cause neither party to such territorial disputes, due to the time
gone by and the vast amount of evidence involved, is able to pro-
duce an absolute title." Thus, as the Island of Palmas case estab-
lished, a court should weigh the claims of the respective parties to
determine which has the superior title .5 As a result, the strength
of one state's claim will depend not only upon the validity of that
claim, but also upon the relative strength of the other state's claim
and the extent to which the other state has acquiesced in or chal-
lenged the former's claim to the disputed territory."
The vital legal point in the dispute, therefore, is precisely to
what extent valid titles had been acquired by either Argentina or
Great Britain before the recent activity began. The Island of Pal-
mas case established that where one of the countries has actually
displayed its sovereignty, it must be shown that the territorial sov-
ereignty continued to exist "and did exist at the moment which for
the decision of dispute must be considered as critical." 5 9 Unfortu-
nately, however, the Island of Palmas case provides no guidelines
for the determination of the critical date. In the Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland case, 60 the Permanent Court of International
Justice selected the moment when Norway openly challenged Den-
mark's rights over Eastern Greenland as the critical date. Further,
in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case,"' the International Court of
Justice defined the critical date as that date "after which the acts
53. Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928), reprinted in 22
AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 883 (1928).
54. For a criticism of the application of the intertemporal law in such situations, see
Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735 (1928).
55. 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 407 (1970).
56. Y. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (1965).
57. See Note, Jurisdiction over Palestine-An Analysis of the Conflicting Arab-Israeli
Claims of Legal Title, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 278-79 (1978).
58. Id. at 281.
59. Jessup, supra note 54, at 743.
60. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1931 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at
42.
61. Minquiers and Ecrehos (U.K. v. Fr.), 1953 I.C.J. 47. For a thorough treatment of the
case, see Johnson, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 3 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 189, 208 (1954).
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or omissions of the parties cannot affect the legal situation. ' '62
Thus, the court determined the critical date to be when the French
Government had made a definite claim to sovereignty in respect of
each of the disputed islets.6 3
From these cases, therefore, even though there are no specific
guidelines, it might be reasonable to suggest that, by analogy, the
critical date for the purposes of the present Argentina-Great Brit-
ain dispute is the moment immediately preceding the invasion of
the Falkland Islands by Argentina. The legality of Argentina's act
of invasion hinges upon the validity or relative superiority of her
claim to sovereignty immediately prior to that invasion. The inva-
sion was a definite claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands,
and it was the moment when the dispute between Argentina and
Great Britian came to a head.
With this background, it is now necessary to apply the modes of
acquiring sovereignty over territory in international law to the re-
spective claims of Argentina and Great Britain.
A. Discovery
In the Island of Palmas case, the United States based its claim
partly upon an alleged Spanish title by a sighting of the island in
the sixteenth century." However, this was a minority view, for the
preferred position is that not even at that time was discovery alone
sufficient for title without some manifestation of possession." Such
manifestation of possession could take the form of a formal annex-
ation of territory by symbolic act.66 Indeed, the diplomatic corre-
spondence of Spain, England, France and the Netherlands, partic-
ularly during the sixteenth century, shows that the foreign offices
of these nations, from the latter part of the fifteenth to the end of
the seventeenth centuries, considered discovery with symbolic tak-
ing of possession as a sufficient basis for establishing legal title to
terra nullius67 Thus, "there has been a tendency to equate discov-
62. Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. at 57.
63. Y. BLUM, supra note 56, at 217.
64. Island of Palmas, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. at 879-84.
65. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies, 25 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 311, 322 (1948).
66. Simsarian, The Acquisition of Legal Title to Terra Nullius, 53 POL. SCL Q. 111, 112
(1938).
67. Id. at 111-20. For a similar view, see A. KELLER, 0. Lissrrz4 & F. MANN, CREATION
OF RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYMBOLIC AcTs 1400-1800, at 148 (1938) [hereinafter
cited as A. KELLER].
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ery with mere visual apprehension."6 8 However, a bare sight-
ing-even when accompanied by disembarcation and explora-
tion-has never been treated as a basis of title. At least before the
eighteenth century, formal symbolic annexation was required. 9
However, due to the appearance of other powers, such as France
and England, which opposed Spanish and Portugese claims to sov-
ereignty over three-quarters of the world in the sixteenth cen-
tury70 a change occurred in the conception of the significance of
symbolic annexation." The posting of signs was not perceived to
be a substitute for effective possession, which bestowed the full
possessory title.7 2 Thus, the symbolic acts were interpreted as a
way of showing to the world that an inchoate title to the territory
discovered had been acquired. This rendered it terra prohibita as
far as other states were concerned, but which did not at once be-
stow absolute control of the territory upon the state which had
posted signs.7
Formal annexation was, therefore, an announcement of the in-
tention to occupy and gave an inchoate title, which was usually
respected provided it was soon followed by a real possession.7 4 Un-
less the inchoate title was perfected by effective possession within
a reasonable time, it would perish or lapse, and other nations
would be free to annex and occupy the territory.7 5 That is, after
symbolic annexation, a state had to, in some degree, "manifest its
will to act as sovereign and actually exercise sovereignty as and
when occasion demands. ''7 6 Moreover, as the Permanent Court
pointed out in the Eastern Greenland decision, "in many cases the
tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of evidence of
sovereign rights, provided that the other state could not make out
a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of claims over
areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries. '77
To summarize, there is a sharp distinction which can be drawn
68. Simsarian, supra note 66, at 111.
69. A. KELLER, supra note 67, at 148-49. See also D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 55, at 408.
70. See supra note 32.
71. Von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in In-
ternational Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 448, 457-58 (1935).
72. Id. at 453-54.
73. Id.
74. M. LINDLEY, supra note 32, at 136-37.
75. Id. See also Von der Heydte, supra note 71, at 453-54.
76. Waldock, supra note 65, at 325.
77. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1931 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at
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between the position taken prior to 1700 and that assumed during
the latter part of the eighteenth century and thereafter. Before
1700, the nations generally recognized that discovery accompanied
by symbolic taking of possession was enough to create legal title to
terra nullius. In the eighteenth century, however, with the emer-
gence of new powers to oppose the claims of Spain and Portugal,
and with the consequent increase in exploration and settlements,
occupation became the test used to determine the extent of as-
serted legal title to territories.
If the presumption is made that, at the time of the first landing
on the Falkland Islands by Captain Strong in 1690, valid title to
terra nullius could be acquired by formal symbolic annexation,
then Britain's claim to sovereignty based upon discovery would be
unassailable (if Captain Strong did in fact make a formal annexa-
tion). However, due to the transition taking place in international
legal theory at that time, it is not certain that such a conclusion
can be reached.
Although there had been early sightings of the Falklands before
1700, settlements were not established on East and West Falkland
until 1764 and 1765, respectively.7 8 If it is assumed that formal an-
nexation alone was insufficient to acquire legal title, and that a
manifestation of sovereignty in the form of "effective occupation"
was required, Spain (through France) might found claims upon her
discovery and annexation of the Falklands at the turn of the eight-
eenth century. The argument would be that the settlement estab-
lished in 1764 amounted to an effective manifestation of sover-
eignty within a reasonable time and was sufficient to turn an
inchoate title acquired through the initial annexation into a full
possessory title.
However, the argument might fail on two grounds. First, there is
no evidence that the French discovered and landed on the Falk-
land Islands before the English. Indeed, the first known landing
was by Captain Strong in 1690. Second, even if there were a
French discovery before 1690, a settlement (which was later sold to
Spain) by the French in 1764 was not established within a time
sufficiently reasonable to create a full possessory title beyond the
already acquired inchoate title.
Conversely, the British would argue at this stage of the analysis
that an inchoate title had been acquired by them which was subse-
quently turned into a full possessory title in 1765. Again, however,
78. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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the argument is weak. Not only might the seventy-five years be-
tween the initial discovery and the subsequent settlement be too
long-causing the initial inchoate title established by annexation
to lapse-but the existence in 1764 of the French settlement on
West Falkland was an inconsistent claim to sovereignty which pre-
vented Britain from manifesting her possession effectively.
On the above interpretation, it is reasonable to submit that any
title which had been acquired through discovery after 1690 was, at
most, an inchoate title which was evanescent and, absent any sub-
sequent manifestations of sovereignty, the territory was open to
annexation and occupation by other nations. On these grounds,
any claim based on discovery after 1690 which Argentina (claiming
title through Spain who acquired title by purchase from the
French) or Great Britain has to sovereignty over the Falkland Is-
lands is ineffective. Consequently, if either nation is to successfully
claim title to the Falklands, the claim must be based on other
grounds.
B. Occupation
If, as the above analysis might indicate, neither Argentina nor
Great Britain can make a claim to title over the Falklands based
upon acts of discovery, claims might be grounded upon occupation
as a mode of acquisition of title to territory. "Occupation" is "the
intentional appropriation by a state of territory not under the sov-
ereignty of any other state.' ' 79 "'Effective occupation' is a term of
art denoting not physical settlement, but the actual, continuous
and peaceful display of the functions of a state."80 Although not
referring specifically to the term "effective occupation," the Per-
manent Court of International Justice in the Eastern Greenland
decision did refer to a title derived from a "continued display of
authority." 8' The court determined that a claim to sovereignty
based on this concept "involves two elements each of which must
be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and
some actual exercise or display of such authority. '82
According to Waldock, the element of an intention and will to
act as sovereign means no more than that "there must be positive
evidence of the pretentions of the particular state to be sovereign
79. G. HACKWORTH, supra note 52, at 401.
80. Waldock, supra note 65, at 334.
81. Eastern Greenland, 1931 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at 45-46.
82. Id.
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over the territory."8 Moreover, this evidence may be either pub-
lished assertions of title or tangible acts of sovereignty.84 The ele-
ment of effective and continuous display of state authority is, how-
ever, susceptible to more detailed analysis. The three leading
authorities on effective occupation, the Island of Palmas" case,
the Eastern Greenland decision,81 and the Clipperton Island87
case, provide that the "exercise or display" of sovereignty must be
1) peaceful, 2) actual, 3) sufficient to confer a valid title to sover-
eignty, and 4) continuous. 88
The peaceful exercise of sovereignty is what distinguishes occu-
pation from prescription." Thus, there must not be an usurpation
of another's subsisting occupation, nor must that occupation be
contested from the start by competing acts of sovereignty.90 That
the exercise or display of sovereignty must be actual requires that
it be genuine. The arbitrator in the Clipperton Island case stated
that "[i]t is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the
force of law,. . . the actual, and not the nominal, taking of posses-
sion is a necessary condition of occupation." 91 Further, the court
said that this taking of possession "consists in the act, or series of
acts, by which the occupying state reduces to its possession the
territory in question and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority
there."92
However, it should be noted that the court stated in the Eastern
Greenland decision that in thinly populated or uninhabited areas,
very little exercise of sovereign rights is needed in the absence of
any competition. 3 Moreover, it had been noted earlier that the ex-
ercise or display of sovereignty does not have to make a noticeable
impact in every nook and cranny of the territory." Thus, "the den-
sity of the acts constituting the exercise or display of sovereignty
varies according to the circumstances of each territory and, in par-
ticular, according to whether it is inhabited or uninhabited."95
83. Waldock, supra note 65, at 334.
84. Id.
85. Island of Palmas, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 867.
86. Eastern Greenland, 1931 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at 44.
87. Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932).
88. Waldock, supra note 65, at 335.
89. See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
90. Waldock, supra note 65, at 335-36.
91. Clipperton Island, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393.
92. Id.
93. Eastern Greenland, 1931 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at 45-46.
94. Island of Palmas, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 877.
95. Waldock, supra note 65, at 336.
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Indeed, such conclusions can also be made with regard to the
third element constituting an exercise or display of sovereignty:
that the display should be sufficient to confer a valid title to sover-
eignty. What is sufficient will, similarly, "depend upon all the cir-
cumstances.'" If the territory has a large population, elaborate ad-
ministrative machinery may be required. However, if the land is
remote "or incapable of accommodating more than a small or tran-
sitory population, a rudimentary administrative organization may
be all that is required." 97 In fact, according to Lindley, in the case
of small islands used only for the purpose of a particular business
such as the catching and canning of fish, the presence of one offi-
cial may be enough." Thus, it seems that the essential ingredient
is not whether there are present on the territory sufficient forces to
repel foreign intrusion, or whether the land is being efficiently ex-
ploited, but whether enough control has been established over the
territory to provide security to life and property there."
The final element necessary for a showing or exercise of author-
ity is that such display be continuous. Regardless of any intention
to the contrary, failure to show continuing state activity will be
fatal to the proof of title by occupation.100 However, as pointed out
by Judge Huber:
Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot be exercised
in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. The inter-
mittence and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of
the right necessarily differ depending on whether inhabited or
uninhabited regions are involved, or regions enclosed within terri-
tories in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or again re-
gions accessible from, for instance, the high seas."0 '
Thus, it would seem that if a state were to exercise sovereignty
over a territory, it would be possible for people to come and go as
necessary, depending upon the type of territory involved.
When the above ingredients necessary for a showing of an actual
exercise of sovereignty are present, and there is also a will and in-
tention to act as sovereign, then the two elements necessary for
effective occupation are satisfied. The task now is to apply this
96. M. LINDLEY, supra note 32, at 159.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 159-60.
100. See Waldock, supra note 65, at 337.
101. Island of Palmas, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. at 877.
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analysis to the historical facts surrounding the settlement of the
Falkland Islands.
The first settlements on the Falklands were in 1764 and 1765.102
Thus, the arguments for effective occupation by Argentina and
Britain begin at this point. It must be remembered that Argentina
claims any title she might have gained through Spain on the basis
that she inherited the Falklands when Argentina became indepen-
dent from Spain in 1811. If Spanish title can be shown, the case for
an Argentine title over the Falklands is strengthened.
Although occupation of the Falkland Islands at some time can
be demonstrated by Spain, it is submitted that, since 1811, it has
not been sufficient to satisfy the requirements outlined above
which are necessary for an effective occupation to provide title.
Not only can it be said that Spain did not intend to act as sover-
eign, but also it is clear that the second prong of the test for effec-
tive occupation-sufficient exercise or display of sovereignty-is
not satisfied either. On West Falkland, the Spanish, after forcibly
removing the British from Port Egmont, did return the settlement
to Britain in 1771, and did disavow any rights to sovereignty.
Moreover, Spain's occupation of East Falkland began in 1767 when
it bought the settlement at Port Louis from France. However,
Spain withdrew from Port Louis in 1811, and took no further in-
terest in the Falkland Islands.
No nation asserted title to the Falklands again until 1820 when
the newly-independent Argentine government claimed the Falk-
lands as a former Spanish possession. On the basis of the near ten-
year absence of any exercise or display of sovereignty by Spain be-
tween 1811 and 1820, combined with the absence of an intent by
Spain to act as sovereign, it is submitted that even if Argentina's
claims to inheritance from Spain were valid, Spain had not effec-
tively occupied the Falkland Islands. Any assertion of Spanish title
ended in 1811.
Moreover, any purported occupation by Argentina after 1820
was also ineffective. Although Argentina tried to administer the
Falkland Islands by the appointment of successive governors on
the islands for the next thirteen years, the British did protest
against Argentina's claims in 1829 and did repossess the Falklands
in 1833.
Indeed, it can be argued that Britain had acquired title to the
Falklands by this time. That the British withdrew from the islands
102. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
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in 1774 is not dispositive of any issue of abandonment. In the Clip-
perton Island case, it was stated:
There is no reason to suppose that France has subsequently lost
her right by derelictio, since she never had the animus of aban-
doning the island, and the fact that she has not exercised her au-
thority there in a positive manner does not imply the forfeiture of
an acquisition already definitively perfected."' 3
Similarly, in contrast to the Spanish withdrawal in 1811, the mere
fact that the British left the Falklands for economic reasons is in-
sufficient to imply the forfeiture of Britain's already-protected ac-
quisition of title. The British clearly did not have any intention
(animus) of abandoning the islands, for they left behind evidence
of British sovereignty in the form of a plaque reiterating British
rights.
As the above analysis shows, sufficiency of the exercise of sover-
eignty varies with the circumstances of each case. The Falklands
were originally uninhabited, and lie in a remote and desolate part
of the South Atlantic. It has already been shown that, in such cir-
cumstances, sovereignty need not be exercised at every possible
moment.1 Thus, Argentina's attempts to acquire sovereignty by
effectively occupying the Falkland Islands after 1820 were incon-
sistent with the prior acquisition of proper title to the islands by
Great Britain. In conclusion, then, it seems that the main weak-
nesses in the British claim to sovereignty based on effective occu-
pation might be that British sovereignty was contested by compet-
ing acts of sovereignty by Spain and/or Argentina. If this is so,
then neither Argentine nor British claims to title are indefeasible.
C. Acquisitive Prescription
If a claim to title by prescription on the part of Argentina is to
be successful, it must be established that Britain abandoned the
Falkland Islands in 1774 in such a way as to allow Argentina to
establish a prescriptive title by 1833. On the other hand, for Brit-
ain to claim a prescriptive title, it must be shown that British sov-
ereignty had not only been manifested in 1765, but continued un-
interrupted after the British withdrawal in 1774.
Prescription as a means of acquiring title to territory is such a
103. Clipperton Island, 26 Am. J. INr'L L., at 394.
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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vague concept that some writers have denied that it exists.' 0 5 To
such international law scholars, the main objection was that no
time could be fixed within which a title by prescription could be
established.10 6 However, it is the view of the majority of writers
that the doctrine of "acquisitive prescription" does in fact exist in
international law. 07 This seems reasonable in view of the underly-
ing reason for its existence, namely, that "a state of things which
actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed
as little as possible." 0 8
Finally, the doctrine of acquisitive prescription arises in two
forms: (1) immemorial possession, in which the origin of an ex-
isting state of affairs is uncertain and, since it is impossible to
prove whether the origin of this state of affairs is legal or illegal, is
presumed to be legal; and (2) that type of prescription akin to the
usucapio of Roman law, in which, although the title was originally
defective, possession suffices to remedy it.'09 Thus, acquisitive pre-
scription has been defined as:
[T]he means by which, under international law, legal recognition
is given to the right of a state to exercise sovereignty over land or
sea territory in cases where that state has, in fact, exercised its
authority in a continuous, uninterrupted, and peaceful manner
over the area concerned for a sufficient period of time, provided
that all other interested and affected states ... have acquiesced
in this exercise of sovereignty."
From this definition, it can be seen that there are certain criteria
which have to be satisfied before prescription can be allowed.
"There must be, positively, an actual assertion of sovereignty sup-
ported by its exercise for a long period, and there must be, nega-
tively, an acquiescence in the claim by the other party.""' These
preconditions for acquisitive prescription must now be examined
more closely, and then applied to the historical facts of the Falk-
105. J.L. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 167 (1963). Scholars who have denied the exis-
tence of prescription in international law include Heifter, de Martens and Rivier.
106. M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 324 (1968).
107. See Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L.
332, 334 (1950).
108. Grisbadama Case (Swed. v. Nor.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 130 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1910). See also D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 55, at 423.
109. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 51, at 144-45. See also I. BaowNLW., PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 144-45 (1966).
110. Johnson, supra note 107, at 353.
111. D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 55, at 423.
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lands dispute in order to determine the validity of claims by Ar-
gentina and Great Britain grounded upon prescription.
1. There Must Be An Actual Assertion Of Sovereignty By The
Prescribing State
This means that there must be an actual display or exercise of
authority on the part of the claiming state, in the same way that
such a condition is necessary for effective occupation.1 2 Indeed, it
has already been shown that there were assertions of sovereignty
over the Falkland Islands by both British and Spanish forces.' 1 3
However, Spain disavowed any assertion of sovereignty in favor of
the British in 1771, and although the Spanish did settle at Port
Louis, the settlement was withdrawn in 1811. Even so, from 1820
until 1833, it might successfully be argued that Argentina did as-
sert sovereignty over the islands, although the relevance of the
British protest must be considered.
Indeed, the British assertion of sovereignty must rest upon ac-
tual occupation until withdrawal in 1774 and thereafter upon the
evidence of such assertion supported by the plaque left behind. Af-
ter 1833, however, the repossession of the Falklands by the British
must surely be sufficient evidence of an assertion of sovereignty.
On this reasoning, therefore, it seems that, at least at some period
of time, both Argentina (through Spain) and Britain have asserted
their sovereignty over the islands.
2. The Assertion Of Possession Must Endure For A Long Pe-
riod Of Time
The question which this second element of prescription raises is:
How much time must elapse before a prescriptive title is acquired?
Although older authors have insisted on immemorial possession,""
the modern view is that the length of time required to gain a pre-
scriptive title depends upon each particular case." s For example,
in the British Guiana- Venezuela Boundary Dispute, fifty years
was found sufficient to create valid title."" To determine the spe-
112. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 30-49 and accompanying text.
114. Grotius favored 300 years, while de Martens and Rivier believed that immemorial
possession was necessary. See Johnson, supra note 107, at 347.
115. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 109, at 148.
116. British Guiana-Venezuela Boundary Dispute (Brit. Guiana v. Venez.), 89 B.F.S.P.
157 (1896).
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cific period required in the instant case would, therefore, be a diffi-
cult task. It is submitted, however, that the thirteen years from
1820 to 1833 is certainly insufficient for title to be acquired by Ar-
gentina, while the 150 years since 1833 is probably more than
enough for Great Britain to assert sovereignty and thereby acquire
title to the Falkland Islands.
3. There Must Be An Acquiescence In The Assertion Of
Possession
To allow acquisitive prescription to operate in instances where
possession has been maintained by force would be contrary to the
very purpose of the doctrine.1 17 However, prescription can operate
where the original act of taking possession was forcible, even if the
subsequent possession was peaceful, for in such cases it seems that
the requisite subsequent acquiescence was present and that, there-
fore, the purpose of the doctrine is not defeated.118 Moreover, this
is so even if the vanquished state protests diplomatically, for pro-
tests of this kind are not sufficient acts to overcome the presump-
tion of acquiescence. 19
Even so, protests might not always have been insufficient to
overcome this presumption of acquiescence. 20 In the Chamizal Ar-
bitration decision"' involving the United States and Mexico, good
title to a tract of land was claimed to be owned by the United
States. Such a contention was founded upon prescription after pos-
session of the territory had been maintained without disturbance,
interruption or challenge. In concluding that "the possession of the
United States . . . was not of such a character as to found a pre-
scriptive title," the Commissioners stated:
Upon the evidence adduced if is impossible to hold that the pos-
session of El Chamizal by the United States was undisturbed, un-
interrupted and unchallenged from ... 1848 until the year 1895,
when, in consequence of the creation of a competent tribunal to
decide the question, the Chamizal case was first presented. On
the contrary, it may be said that the physical possession taken by
citizens of the United States and the political control exercised by
the local and federal governments, have been constantly chal-
117. Johnson, supra note 107, at 345.
118. Id. at 346.
119. Id. But see I. BROWNLE, supra note 109, at 147.
120. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 109, at 147.
121. Chamizal Arbitration (U.S. v. Mex.), reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 806 (1911).
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lenged and questioned by the Republic of Mexico, through its
accredited diplomatic agents.'"
However, more recent developments have affected the potential
value of the diplomatic protest to interrupt peaceful possession. 123
These developments consist in the creation of international insti-
tutions to which resort can be had in order to prevent the forma-
tion of prescriptive titles. 12  As the Commissioners said in the
Chamizal Arbitration decision, "[i]n private law, the interruption
of prescription is effected by a suit, but in dealings between na-
tions this is of course impossible, unless and until an international
tribunal is established for such purpose.11 25 This international ju-
dicial machinery now exists, for the establishment of the League of
Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1919,
and then of the United Nations and International Court of Justice
in 1948, has modified the former practice whereby the diplomatic
protest was the only method, short of war, of interrupting peaceful
possession. It can be argued that as a result of these developments
the diplomatic protest as a method of interrupting peaceful posses-
sion has, since 1919, been relegated to the background. Now, if the
matter is a proper one for determination by the General Assembly
or the International Court of Justice, failure to refer a matter to
the appropriate body must be presumed to amount to acquiescence
even if, for propaganda purposes or other reasons, "paper protests"
are made from time to time. "
The fact that Great Britain protested against Argentine actions
in 1829 is very relevant in determining whether the British acqui-
esced to possession of the Falklands by Argentina. Argentine pro-
tests against British action after 1919, absent a referral by Argen-
tina of the dispute to either the League of Nations or United
Nations, must be considered less relevant, and cannot amount to
an interruption of British possession. Thus, the governance of the
Falklands by Argentina from 1820 to 1833 must be considered to
have been interrupted by British protests in 1829.
However, after 1833, there is no evidence of official protests by
Argentina before 1919, and any protests after this time were not
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. See MacGibbon, Some Observations on the Part of Protest in International Law,
30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 293, 310 (1953).
124. Id.
125. Chamizal Arbitration, 5 Am. J. INT'L L. at 807.
126. Johnson, supra note 107, at 342, 346.
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followed by a referral of the dispute to the appropriate interna-
tional body. Indeed, there is evidence that Argentina specifically
refused to refer the matter to either the International Court of
Justice or the General Assembly of the United Nations. Argentina
clearly failed to satisfy this precondition for a prescriptive title,
while Britain has had uninterrupted possession of the Falkland Is-
lands since 1833.
On the basis of the above, therefore, it is reasonable to submit
that the argument that Argentina acquired a prescriptive title to
the islands between 1764 and 1833 is a weak one. Spain disavowed
sovereignty in favor of Britain in 1771 and took no further interest
in them after 1777. Moreover, the Argentine governorship between
1820 and 1833 was met with protest from Britain, which held the
Falklands continually after that time. No prescriptive title could
have been acquired by Argentina, because there was neither acqui-
escence, nor a period of time long enough to acquire it.
Conversely, Great Britain could arguably have asserted sover-
eignty successfully over the Falklands since 1764. Even if this were
not the case, it is without doubt that British sovereignty was as-
serted continuously after 1833, and at no time has Argentina, ex-
cept by military invasion in 1982, not been presumed to acquiesce.
D. Summary
From this analysis of the modes of territorial acquisition, it has
been shown that Argentine claims to sovereignty over the Falkland
Islands are, at best, weak. Even if Argentina's claim of inheritance
from Spain is allowed, the unavoidable conclusion seems to be
that, notwithstanding the merits of claims prior to 1833, the con-
tinuous holding of the Falklands by Great Britain after 1833 must
mean that a title has been acquired by Britain through prescrip-
tion. The only task remaining is to apply this conclusion to the
events surrounding the invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 in
order to determine the legality of both Argentine and British
actions.
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND THE
BRITISH RESPONSE
The starting point in the determination of the legality of the ac-
tions taken by Argentina and Great Britain during the Falklands
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conflict in 1982 must be the United Nations Charter. 2 7 Regardless
of to whom the islands belong, the military invasion by Argentina
must be illegal in any circumstances. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter provides that "[aill Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."' 28
Thus the military action undertaken by Argentina was specifically
outlawed; Argentina was clearly the aggressor.
That Argentina acted outside the parameters of the rules laid
down by the United Nations Charter was recognized at once by the
Security Council when it adopted Resolution 502, which demanded
an end to hostilities and the immediate removal of Argentine
forces from the Falklands, and called upon Argentina and Great
Britian to settle the dispute through negotiation in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the Charter.12 9 It must be pre-
sumed that this resolution was adopted under articles 39 and 40.
Article 39 provides that "[t]he Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international
peace and security."130 In turn, article 40 provides that "[in order
to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council
may, before making the recommendations . . . call upon the par-
ties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it
deems necessary or desirable.''13 1
However, to be read in conjunction with articles 39 and 40 is
article 51 under which Great Britain purported to invoke her right
to act in self-defense. Article 51 provides that: "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and security."'3
2
127. Article I of the Charter asserts that the aims of the United Nations and its Charter
are to maintain international peace, to develop international relations and to foster interna-
tional cooperation in solving problems among nations. For a thorough discussion of the doc-
ument, see M. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COM-
MENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (3d ed. 1969).
128. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
129. See supra note 4.
130. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (emphasis added).
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 40 (emphasis added).
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
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Even though the Security Council had passed Resolution 502
before Great Britain acted in self-defense, it is evident that Reso-
lution 502 was a "provisional" measure taken under article 40. Fur-
ther, Great Britain acted according to the terms of the Charter in
invoking the right of self-defense under article 51, for article 40
provides also that "such provisional measures shall be without
prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties con-
cerned."33 Thus, article 51 could still be validly invoked by Great
Britain.
Indeed, not only did article 51 provide Great Britain with suffi-
cient ground upon which to assert her right of self-defense, but
adequate foundation was also provided by customary international
law. The Caroline case " 4 sets out the elements necessary for lawful
acts of self-defense. There, a British force from Canada entered
upon United States territory, seized the vessel Caroline in the
State of New York and destroyed her. Great Britain protested and
the correspondence which followed is accepted as the classical for-
mulation of the conditions upon which an invasion of territory can
be justified under the concept of self-defense. " There must be a
"necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation," and the action taken
must not be "unreasonable or excessive," but "limited by that ne-
cessity and kept clearly within it.""'
Britain's actions in sending the naval task force to the Falkland
Islands were necessary. Without such a force, the Falklands could
not have been regained by the British, for there was no other way
to remove the several thousand Argentine troops which had landed
there. Negotiations hitherto had failed. The subsequent action
taken by Great Britain was therefore not unreasonable, nor exces-
sive and was limited to the specific aim of retaking the islands as a
necessary act of self-defense.
Britain's actions in sending a task force and in retaking the Fal-
klands by military means seem to satisfy both article 51 and the
criteria of the Caroline case. Moreover, by showing herself to be
willing to conduct negotiations through diplomatic channels with
United States Secretary of State Haig, Britain also satisfied Reso-
lution 502. Conversely, the presence of Argentine forces on the Fal-
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 40 (emphasis added).
134. 29 B.F.S.P. 1137 (1937). See also Jennings, The Caroline and MacLeod Cases, 32
AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
135. D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 55, at 316.
136. Id. See also M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 51, at 280.
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klands and the refusal to withdraw violated both article 2, para-
graph 4, and Resolution 502.
The final events which must be considered consist of the imple-
mentation of the exclusion zones and the subsequent sinkings of
the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano and the British destroyer
HMS Sheffield.
Notwithstanding the legality of British military action in retak-
ing the islands, it cannot be doubted that the British response to
the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in declaring the maritime
exclusion zone was justified. The maritime exclusion zone applied
to "Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries and it was made clear
that other innocent vessels should keep away from the zone in the
event of a naval engagement."1 37
It has been asserted by Russia " that the exclusion zone around
the islands was illegal under article 2 of the 1908 Geneva Conven-
tion on the High Seas. " 9
However, in neither the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
nor the Convention on the Law of the Sea14 0 is there reference to
circumstances in which such security measures as exclusion zones
can or cannot be taken. It seems adequately clear, therefore, that
the validity of the creation of a maritime exclusion zone-no mat-
ter of what limitations-must depend upon the right of self-de-
fense. Since Argentina has played the role of the aggressor, the es-
tablishment of an Argentine maritime exclusion zone must be
considered illegal. Conversely, the implementation of a similar
zone by Great Britain was a lawful act of self-defense.
The above reasoning begs the question: How could the General
Belgrano legally have been torpedoed when it was thirty-six miles
137. See Barston & Birnie, The Falkland Islands/Isles Malvinas Conflict: A Question of
Zones, 7 MAR. POL'v 14, 20 (1983).
138. See Glover supra note 33, at 192.
139. 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. Article 2 provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under
the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international
law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of
international law, shall be exercised by all states with reasonable regard to the
interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
140. Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doec. A/Conf. 62/121 and U.N. Doec. A/
Conf. 62/122, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982.
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outside the declared exclusion zone? However, the answer is sim-
ple. The zone was set up as a defensive measure. Yet the British,
defending the Falklands, did not have to wait for the enemy to
attack by entering within the delineated boundary before British
forces could open fire. This is because "[tihe law has not tradition-
ally required a State to wait until it is actually attacked before
taking measures of self-defense; and in considering whether pre-
emptive reasons are legitimate or not, the capability of weapons,
the reaction time and the strategic situations are all factors to be
taken into account.' 1
41
Moreover, as Bowett' 42 has commented, it is generally recognized
that "a state may exercise its authority on the high seas in excep-
tional circumstances where this is necessary to forestall a real
threat to its territorial integrity and general security. '14 Thus, in
the circumstances of May 2, 1982, where there was a cruiser and
two Argentine destroyers zig-zagging menacingly to and fro near
the edge of the exclusion zone, and where the effective range of the
Argentine destroyer's guns was over twenty miles, it seems reason-
able that action should be taken in self-defense to avert such a
threat.
Of course, some may argue that the large cruiser was harmless
and was picked on because it was an easier target than the two
destroyers. But this is less relevant when it is considered that in
any event no zone limit of two hundred miles was required. As it
has been shown above, the exercise of the right of self-defense is
limited only by the nature of the attack and proportionality of the
response. Further, the United Kingdom, in declaring the exclusion
zone, added that the measures were "without prejudice to the right
of the United Kingdom to take additional measures which may be
needed in exercise of its rights of self-defense under article 51 of
the United Nations Charter, thereby preserving her right to take
defensive measures beyond the exclusion zone.''1 44
If the attack by the British on the Argentine cruiser General
Belgrano can be justified as an act of self-defense, the same rea-
soning must lead one to conclude that the missile attack on the
British destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was not justified since Argentina
was the aggressor in the conflict, not the defender. Moreover, even
if Argentina attempted to argue that the Sheffield attack was a
141. D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 55, at 316.
142. D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (1958).
143. See Glover, supra note 33, at 193.
144. Barston & Birnie, supra note 137, at 21.
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valid reprisal for the attack on the Belgrano, it would still be ille-
gal under article 2 of the United Nations Charter as an unlawful
act of force. " 5
VI. IN CONCLUSION: PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT
In 1774, the British garrison abandoned the Falkland Islands,
but left behind evidence of British rule. In 1832, Great Britain
again took possession of the islands amid protests from Argentina,
who was claiming to be the successor of the rights of Spain which
were acquired by discovery. The British absence from the islands
was thus for a period of fifty-eight years. Had Argentina occupied
the Falklands effectively during this period, she might have ac-
quired good title. However, it seems that on the return of the Brit-
ish in 1833 the islands were either British or terra nullius. In ei-
ther event, because Great Britain has held the Falklands
continuously since 1833, British title is indefeasible. Moreover,
such a conclusion is quite valid when it is remembered that title in
international law is a relative concept and, therefore, a superior
title is all that is required.14 6
On this conclusion, the action taken by Argentina in invading
the Falkland Islands in April, 1982, was not only unjustified, but
contrary to general principles of international law. Conversely, the
British response constituted a series of lawful acts of self-defense.
However, the only apparent outcome of the 1982 conflict has been
the fall of a government in Argentina and the rise of a government
in Britain. The overriding problem which must still be solved is
whether a permanent agreement over the future of the Falkland
Islands can be reached between the United Kingdom and
Argentina.
In the wake of the Falklands conflict of 1982, it is the writer's
view that the United Nations has not acted as decisively as it could
have done under the circumstances. The Secretary-General of the
United Nations should again invoke article 99 of the United Na-
tions Charter and take the still somewhat simmering dispute over
the future of the Falkland Islands to the floor of the General As-
sembly. Once there, the Assembly should adhere more strictly to
its own Charter and apply to this situation the principle of self-
determination enunciated in articles 1 and 51 of that document.
In article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter, one of the purposes of
145. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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the United Nations is stated to be the development of "friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples."" 7 In article 55, the same
formula is used to express the general aims of the United Nations
in the fields of social and economic development and respect for
human rights.' 48 Further, through a number of resolutions, the
content of the principle of self-determination has been defined
more precisely. Thus, the Colonial Declaration 4 9 provides that:
"All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.' 150 Under this ar-
ticle, the Falklanders could decide for themselves under whose sov-
ereignty, if any, they wish to live. Since the islanders consider
themselves British citizens, and wish to remain so, it is unlikely
that Argentina will choose to take this route to settlement on her
own initiative. The Secretary-General must at this time be firm.
Perhaps, however, if the governments of the United Kingdom
and Argentina were sensible, they would submit their respective
claims to the International Court of Justice. If both sides believe
that their respective claims have substance, what has each to lose?
Moreover, in light of the above analysis and of previous cases in
which disputed sovereignty over territory has been treated, this
seems to be a classic case for adjudication by the International
Court.
The use of the court has been declining in recent years, and if a
judicial decision could be made which would end 150 years of quar-
reling between two nations, the effect on international affairs and
relations generally would be valuable. Unfortunately, because sub-
mission of a claim to the International Court of Justice is volun-
tary, and in light of the legal conclusion contained in the above
analysis, it is felt that Argentina is unlikely to allow the dispute to
be decided in this way.
If, in the ensuing months, when blood might still be boiling and
hopes of a transfer of sovereignty or a leaseback arrangement have
faded, then it has been suggested that a possibly viable and more
neutral alternative might be to incorporate the Falklands Islands
into the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty. 51 The Treaty,
147. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
148. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
149. G.A. Res 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 57, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1960).
150. Id.
151. Antartic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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which entered into force in 1961, is reviewable in 1991.151 This
would be a reasonable, "unemotional date for Great Britain and
Argentina, which are both signatories to it, to work towards.'15 3
Under the treaty, no military activity, and no pushing of compet-
ing claims in the area is permitted.'" This could be extended to
include the Falkland Islands.
In conclusion, however, it must be said that if the outcome of
the above legal analysis is to be taken seriously, then it is recom-
mended that the government of the United Kingdom should not
submit to any Argentine claim or terms of negotiation. The best
route for the United Kingdom is to strive for a judicial determina-
tion of title to the islands in the International Court of Justice, for
if British title is as indefeasible as it seems, then the United King-
dom has everything to gain and nothing to lose.
152. The Economist, Apr. 2, 1983, at 10.
153. Id.
154. Id.
